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Abstract
The phenomenon of sponsored search advertising—where advertisers pay a fee to Internet search
engines to be displayed alongside organic (nonsponsored) Web search results—is gaining ground as the
largest source of revenues for search engines. Using a unique six-month panel data set of several
hundred keywords collected from a large nationwide retailer that advertises on Google, we empirically
model the relationship between different sponsored search metrics such as click-through rates,
conversion rates, cost per click, and ranking of advertisements. Our paper proposes a novel framework to
better understand the factors that drive differences in these metrics. We use a hierarchical Bayesian
modeling framework and estimate the model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods. Using a
simultaneous equations model, we quantify the relationship between various keyword characteristics,
position of the advertisement, and the landing page quality score on consumer search and purchase
behavior as well as on advertiser's cost per click and the search engine's ranking decision. Specifically, we
find that the monetary value of a click is not uniform across all positions because conversion rates are
highest at the top and decrease with rank as one goes down the search engine results page. Though
search engines take into account the current period's bid as well as prior click-through rates before
deciding the final rank of an advertisement in the current period, the current bid has a larger effect than
prior click-through rates. We also find that an increase in landing page quality scores is associated with
an increase in conversion rates and a decrease in advertiser's cost per click. Furthermore, our analysis
shows that keywords that have more prominent positions on the search engine results page, and thus
experience higher click-through or conversion rates, are not necessarily the most profitable ones—profits
are often higher at the middle positions than at the top or the bottom ones. Besides providing managerial
insights into search engine advertising, these results shed light on some key assumptions made in the
theoretical modeling literature in sponsored search.
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Abstract

The phenomenon of sponsored search advertising – where advertisers pay a fee to Internet search
engines to be displayed alongside organic (non-sponsored) web search results – is gaining ground as the
largest source of revenues for search engines. Using a unique 6 month panel dataset of several hundred
keywords collected from a large nationwide retailer that advertises on Google, we empirically model the
relationship between different metrics such as click-through rates, conversion rates, cost-per-click, and
ranks of these advertisements. Our paper proposes a novel framework and data to better understand
what drives these differences. We use a Hierarchical Bayesian modeling framework and estimate the
model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. Using a simultaneous equations model, we
quantify the impact of keyword type and length, position of the advertisement and the landing page
quality on consumer search and purchase behavior as well as on advertiser’s cost per click and the
search engine’s ranking decision for different ads. Our results provide descriptive and quantitative
insights to advertisers about what attributes of sponsored keyword advertisements contribute to
variation in advertiser value, and how much to invest in search engine optimization campaigns versus
search engine marketing campaigns. Our analyses also lend quantitative insights into the relative
economic impact of different kinds of advertisements such as retailer-specific ads, brand specific ads or
generic ads. We also discuss how our empirical estimates shed light on some assumptions made by
existing theoretical models in sponsored search advertising.
Keywords: Online advertising, Search engines, Hierarchical Bayesian modeling, Paid search, Click-through rates,
Conversion rates, Keyword ranking, Bid price, Electronic commerce.

1Anindya

Ghose is an Assistant Professor of Information Systems, and Sha Yang is an Associate Professor of
Marketing, both at Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012.
The authors would like to thank the anonymous company that provided data for this study. The authors are
listed in alphabetical order and contributed equally. We are grateful to the Editor, Associate Editor and three
anonymous referees for extremely helpful comments. We also thank Susan Athey, Michael Baye, Avi Goldfarb,
Greg Lewis, and other participants at the 2008 IIO Conference, the 2008 NET Institute conference, the 2008
Marketing Science Institute conference, the WSDM 2008 conference, University of Washington, McGill
University, New York University, UT Dallas Marketing Conference, WISE 2007 conference, and INFORMSCIST 2007 for helpful comments. Anindya Ghose acknowledges the generous financial support from NSF
CAREER award (IIS-0643847). Partial funding for this project was also provided by the NET Institute and the
Marketing Science Institute. The usual disclaimer applies.

1. Introduction
The Internet has brought about a fundamental change in the way users generate and obtain
information, thereby facilitating a paradigm shift in consumer search and purchase patterns. In this
regard, search engines are able to leverage their value as information location tools by selling advertising
linked to user generated queries and referring them to the advertisers. Indeed, the phenomenon of
sponsored search advertising – where advertisers pay a fee to Internet search engines to be displayed
alongside organic (non-sponsored) web search results – is gaining ground as the largest source of
revenues for search engines. The global paid search advertising market is predicted to have a 37%
compound annual growth rate, to more than $33 billion in 2010 and has become a critical component
of firm’s marketing campaigns.
Search engines like Google, Yahoo and MSN have discovered that as intermediaries between users and
firms, they are in a unique position to try new forms of advertisements without annoying consumers. In
this regard, sponsored search advertising has gradually evolved to satisfy consumers’ penchant for
relevant search results and advertisers' desire for inviting high quality traffic to their websites. These
advertisements are based on customers’ own queries and are hence considered far less intrusive than
online banner ads or pop-up ads. The specific ‘keywords’ in response to which the ads are displayed are
often chosen by firms based on user-generated content in online product reviews, social networks and
blogs where users have posted their opinions about firms’ products, often highlighting the specific
product features they value the most. In many ways, the increased ability of users to interact with firms
in the online world has enabled a shift from ‘mass’ advertising to more ‘targeted’ advertising.
How does this mechanism work? In sponsored search, firms who wish to advertise their products or
services on the Internet submit their product information in the form of specific ‘keyword’ listings to
search engines. Bid values are assigned to each individual ad to determine the placement of each listing
among search results when a user performs a search. When a consumer searches for that term on a
search engine, the advertisers’ web page appears as a sponsored link next to the organic search results
that would otherwise be returned using the neutral criteria employed by the search engine. By allotting a
specific value to each keyword, an advertiser only pays the assigned price for the people who click on
their listing to visit its website. Because listings appear when a keyword is searched for, an advertiser
can reach a more targeted audience on a much lower budget.
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Despite the growth of search advertising, we have little understanding of how consumers respond to
contextual and sponsored search advertising on the Internet. In this paper, we focus on previously
unexplored issues: How does sponsored search advertising affect consumer search and purchasing
behavior on the Internet? More specifically, what content attributes of a sponsored advertisement
contribute to variation in advertiser value in terms of consumer click-through rates and conversions?
How does keyword content influence the advertiser’s actual bidding decisions, and the search engine’s
advertisement ranking decision? While an emerging stream of theoretical literature in sponsored search
has looked at issues such as mechanism design in auctions, no prior work has empirically analyzed these
kinds of questions. Given the shift in advertising from traditional banner advertising to search engine
advertising, an understanding of the determinants of conversion rates and click-through rates in search
advertising is essential for both traditional and Internet retailers.
Using a unique panel dataset of several hundred keywords collected from a large nationwide retailer
that advertises on Google, we study the effect of sponsored search advertising on consumer and firm
behavior. In particular, we propose a Hierarchical Bayesian modeling framework in which we build a
simultaneous model to jointly estimate the impact of various attributes of sponsored keyword
advertisements on consumer click-through and purchase propensities, on the advertiser’s cost per click
decision and on the search engine ad ranking decision. The presence of retailer-specific information in
the keyword is associated with an increase in click-through and conversion rates by 14.72% and 50.6%,
respectively, the presence of brand-specific information in the keyword is associated with a decrease in
click-through and conversion rates by 56.6% and 44.2%, respectively, while the length of the keyword
is associated with a decrease in click-through rates by 13.9%. Keyword rank is negatively associated
with the click-through rates and conversion rates and this is increasing at a decreasing rate. Our findings
show that an increase in the landing page quality of the advertiser can lead to an increase in conversion
rates by as much as 22.5%. Further, we show that the advertiser’s CPC is negatively affected by the
landing page quality as well as by the presence of its own information but positively affected by the
presence of brand-specific information in the keyword.
Our paper aims to make both methodological and substantive contributions to the literature. These can
be summarized as follows. First, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first empirical study that
simultaneously models and documents the impact of search engine advertising on all three entities
involved in the process – consumers, advertisers and search engines. The proposed simultaneous model
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provides a natural way to account for endogenous relationships between decision variables, leading to a
robust identification strategy and precise estimates. The model can be applied to similar data from other
industries. Moreover, unlike previous work, we jointly study consumer click-through behavior and
conversion behavior conditional on a click-through in studying consumer search behavior. Ignoring
consumer click-through behavior can lead to selectivity bias if the error terms in the click-through
probability and in the conditional conversion probability are correlated (Maddala 1983), and this is an
additional contribution. The proposed Bayesian estimation algorithm provides a convenient way to
estimate such model by using data augmentation.
Second, our model provides useful descriptive insights to advertisers about what content attributes of
sponsored keyword advertisements contribute to variation in advertiser value. In particular, our study
quantifies the relationship between branded/retailer/generic and shorter/longer keywords and demand
side variables like click-through rates and conversion rates – a question of increasing interest to many
firms. Additionally, advertisers are interested in determining how much to invest in search engine
optimization campaigns (for example, by improving landing page qualities) versus search engine
marketing campaigns (for example, by investing in higher bids in the auction process). By quantifying
the impact of landing page quality on conversion rates and the cost per click of search advertising, and
by comparing this to the relationship of keyword attributes with these variables, our study can also help
managers make better decisions regarding investments in the online advertising domain.
Third, by showing a direct negative relationship between conversion rates and rank, we show that the
value per click to an advertiser is not uniform across slots. This finding refutes a commonly held
assumption in the industry is that the value of a click from a sponsored search campaign is independent
of the position of the advertisement. Prior theoretical work (Aggarwal et al. 2006, Edelman et al. 2007,
Varian 2007) also make a common assumption of uniform value per click across all ranks and show
that under this condition, sponsored search auctions maximize social welfare. Our finding of nonuniformity in value per click paves the way for future theoretical models in this domain that could relax
this assumption and design new mechanisms with more robust equilibrium properties. The recent work
by Borgers et al. (2007) that incorporates non-uniform values for clicks in their theoretical model is a
step in this direction. Further, by demonstrating that search engines are indeed taking into account both
the bid price as well as prior click-through rates of the keywords before deciding the final rank of an
advertisement, our findings contribute towards providing empirical evidence regarding other
3

assumptions made in the theoretical work about sponsored keyword auction mechanisms in search
engine advertising.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the different
streams of literature from marketing and computer science related to our paper. Section 3 describes the
data and gives a brief background into some different aspects of sponsored search advertising that
could be useful before we proceed to the empirical models and analyses. In Section 4, we present a
model to study the click-through rate, conversion rate and keyword ranking simultaneously, and discuss
our identification strategy. In Section 5 we discuss our empirical findings. In Section 6, we discuss some
implications of our findings and then conclude the paper.

2. Literature and Theoretical Background
Our paper is related to several streams of research. A number of approaches have been build to
modeling the effects of advertising based on aggregate data (Tellis 2004). Much of the existing academic
(e.g., Gallagher et al. 2001, Dreze & Hussherr 2003) on advertising in online world has focused on
measuring changes in brand awareness, brand attitudes, and purchase intentions as a function of
exposure. This is usually done via field surveys or laboratory experiments using individual (or cookie)
level data. Sherman & Deighton (2001) and Ilfeld & Winer (2002), show using aggregate data that
increased online advertising leads to more site visits. In contrast to other studies which measure
(individual) exposure to advertising via aggregate advertising dollars (e.g., Mela et al. 1998, Ilfeld &
Winer 2002), we use data on individual search keyword advertising exposure. Manchanda et al. (2006)
look at online banner advertising. Because banner ads have been perceived by many consumers as
being annoying, traditionally they have had a negative connotation associated with it. Moreover, it was
argued that since there is considerably evidence that only a small proportion of visits translate into final
purchase (Sherman & Deighton 2001, Moe & Fader 2003, Chatterjee et al. 2003), click-through rates
may be too imprecise for measuring the effectiveness of banners served to the mass market.
Interestingly however, Manchanda et al. (2006), found that banner advertising actually increases
purchasing behavior, in contrast to conventional wisdom. These studies therefore highlight the
importance of investigating the impact of other kinds of online advertising such as search keyword
advertising on actual purchase behavior, since the success of keyword advertising is also based on
consumer click-through rates. Our study is also related to other forms of paid placements available to
retailers on the internet available such as sponsored listings on shopping bots (e.g., Baye and Morgan
4

2001, Baye et al. 2008) who have studied the role of shopping bots as information gate keepers and
estimated the impact of retailers’ rank during placement on click-through rates.
There is also an emerging theoretical stream of literature exemplified by Aggarwal et al. (2006),
Edelman et al. (2007), Feng et al. (2007), Varian (2007), and Liu et al. (2008) who analyze mechanism
design and equilibria in search engine auctions. Chen and He (2006), and Athey & Ellison (2008) build
models that integrate consumer behavior with advertiser decisions, and the latter paper theoretically
analyzes several possible scenarios in the design of sponsored keyword auctions. Katona &Sarvary
(2007) build a model of competition in sponsored search and find that the interaction between search
listings and paid links determine equilibrium bidding behavior.
Despite the emerging theory work, very little empirical work exists in online search advertising. This is
primarily because of difficulty for researchers to obtain such advertiser-level data. Existing work has so
far focused on search engine performance (Telang et al. 2004, Bradlow & Schmittlein 2000). Moreover,
the handful of studies that exist in search engine marketing have typically analyzed publicly available
data from search engines. Animesh et al. (2008) look at the presence of quality uncertainty and adverse
selection in paid search advertising on search engines. Goldfarb and Tucker (2007) examine the factors
that drive variation in prices for advertising legal services on Google. Agarwal et al. (2008) provide
quantitative insights into the profitability of advertisements associated with differences in keyword
position. Ghose and Yang (2008) build a model to map consumers’ search-purchase relationship in
sponsored search advertising. They provide evidence of horizontal spillover effects from search
advertising resulting in purchases across other product categories. Rutz & Bucklin (2007b) showed that
there are spillovers between search advertising on branded and generic keywords, as some customers
may start with a generic search to gather information, but later use a branded search to complete their
transaction. In an interesting paper related to our work, Rutz & Bucklin (2007a) studied hotel marketing
keywords to analyze the profitability of different campaign management strategies. However, our paper
differs from theirs and extends their work in several important ways. Rutz & Bucklin (2007a) only
model the conversion probability conditional on positive number of click-throughs. However, our
paper models click-through and conversion rates simultaneously in order to alleviate potential
selectivity biases. In addition, we also model the search engine’s ranking decision and the advertiser’s
decision on cost-per-click (CPC), both of which are absent in their paper. Our analysis reveals that it is
important to model the advertiser and the search engine’s decisions simultaneously with clicks and
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conversion since both ‘CPC’ and ‘Rank’ have been found to be endogenous. These issues are not
addressed in their paper.
To summarize, our research is distinct from extant online advertising research as it has largely been
limited to the influence of banner advertisements on attitudes and behavior. We extend the literature by
empirically comparing the impact of different keyword characteristics on the performance of online
search advertising in paid search towards understanding the larger question of analyzing how keyword
characteristics drive consumers’ search and purchase behavior, as well as firms’ optimal bid prices and
ranking decisions.

3. Data
We first describe the data generation process for paid keyword advertisement since it differs on many
dimensions from traditional offline advertisement. Advertisers bid on keywords during the auction
process. A keyword may consist of one or more ‘words’. Once the advertiser gets a rank allotted for its
keyword ad, these sponsored ads are displayed on the top left, and right of the computer screen in
response to a query that a consumer types on the search engine. The ad typically consists of headline, a
word or a limited number of words describing the product or service, and a hyperlink that refers the
consumer to the advertiser’s website after a click. The serving of the ad in response to a query for a
certain keyword is denoted as an impression. If the consumer clicks on the ad, he is led to the landing
page of the advertiser’s website. This is recorded as a click, and advertisers usually pay on a per click
basis. In the event that the consumer ends up purchasing a product from the advertiser, this is recorded
as a conversion.
Our data contains weekly information on paid search advertising from a large nationwide retail chain,
which advertises on Google.2 The data span all keyword advertisements by the company during a
period of six months in 2007, specifically for the 24 calendar weeks from January to June. Each
keyword in our data has a unique advertisement ID. The data is for a given keyword for a given week.
It consists of the number of impressions, number of clicks, the average cost per click (CPC) which
represents the bid price, the rank of the keyword, the number of conversions, and the total revenues

2

The firm is a large Fortune-500 retail store chain with several hundred retail stores in the US but due to the nature of the
data sharing agreement between the firm and us, we are unable to reveal the name of the firm.
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from a conversion. While an impression often leads to a click, it may not lead to an actual purchase
(defined as a conversion). Based on these data, we compute the Click-through Rate (clicks/impressions)
and Conversion Rate (conversions/clicks) variables. The product of CPC and number of clicks gives the
total costs to the firm for sponsoring a particular advertisement. Based on the contribution margin and
the revenues from each conversion through a paid search advertisement, we are able to compute the
gross profit per keyword from a conversion. The difference between gross profits and keyword
advertising costs (the number of clicks times the cost-per-click) gives the net profits accruing to the
retailer from a sponsored keyword conversion. This is the Profit variable.
Finally, while we have data on the URLs of the landing page corresponding to a given keyword, we do
not have data on landing page quality scores or content, since the exact algorithm used by Google to
impute the landing page quality is not disclosed to the public.3 Hence, we use a semi-automated
approach with content analysis to impute the landing page quality based on the three known metrics
used by Google. Google uses a weighted average of Relevancy, Transparency and Navigability to
impute the landing page quality of a given weblink. We hired two independent annotators to rate each
landing page based on each of these metrics and then computed the weighted average of the scores.
The inter-rater reliability score was 0.73, indicating a very high level of reliability.
Our final dataset includes 9664 observations from a total of 1878 unique keywords. Note that our main
interest in this empirical investigation is to examine various factors that drive differences in clickthroughs and conversions. Hence, we analyze click-through rates, conversion rates, cost-per-click, and
rank by jointly modeling the consumers’ search and purchase behavior, the advertiser’s decision on cost
per click, and the search engine’s keyword rank allocating behavior. Table 1 reports the summary
statistics of our dataset. As shown, the average weekly number of impressions is 411 for one keyword,
among which around 46 lead to a click-through, and 0.85 lead to a purchase. Our data suggest the
average cost per-click for a given keyword is about 25 cents, and the average rank (position) of these
keywords is about 6.92. Finally, we have information on three important keyword characteristics, which
3Google

computes a quality score for each landing page as a function of the site’s navigability as well as the relevance and
transparency of information on that page in order to provide higher user experience after a click-through to the site. Besides
these relevancy factors, the quality score is also based on click-through rates. However, the exact algorithm for computing
this score is not publicly available. The quality score is then used in determining the minimum bid price, which in turn
affects the rank of the ad, given the typical advertiser budget constraints. Further information on these aspects is available at
www.adwords.google.com.
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we next briefly discuss with a focus on the rationale of analyzing them. As Table 1 shows, there is a
substantial amount of variation in clicks, conversion, rank and CPC of each keyword over time.
We enhanced the dataset by introducing keyword-specific characteristics such as Brand, Retailer and
Length. For each keyword, we constructed two dummy variables, based on whether they were (i)
branded keywords or not (for example, “Sealy mattress”, “Nautica bedsheets”), and (ii) retailer-specific
advertisements (for example, “Wal-Mart”, “walmart.com”) or not. To be precise, for creating the
variable in (i) we looked for the presence of a brand name (either a product-specific or a company
specific) in the keyword, and labeled the dummy as 1 or 0, with 1 indicating the presence of a brand
name. For (ii), we looked for the presence of the specific advertiser’s (retailer) name in the keyword,
and then labeled the dummy as 1 or 0, with 1 indicating the presence of the retailer’s name.
= = Insert Table 1 = =

4. A Simultaneous Model of Click-through, Conversion, CPC and Keyword Rank
We cast our model in a hierarchical Bayesian framework and estimate it using Markov Chain Monte
Carlo methods (see Rossi and Allenby 2003 for a detailed review of such models). We postulate that the
decision of whether to click and purchase in a given week will be affected by the probability of
advertising exposure (for example, through the rank of the keyword) and individual keyword-level
differences (both observed and unobserved). We simultaneously model consumers’ click-through and
conversion behavior, the advertiser’s keyword pricing behavior, and the search engine’s keyword rank
allocating behavior.
4.1 Theoretical setup
Assume for search keyword i at week j, there are nij click-throughs among Nij impressions (the number
of times an advertisement is displayed by the retailer), where nij ≤ Nij and Nij > 0. Suppose that among
the nij click-throughs, there are mij click-throughs that lead to purchases, where mij ≤ nij. Let us further
assume that the probability of having a click-through is pij and the probability of having a purchase
conditional on a click-through is qij. In our model, a consumer faces decisions at two levels – one, when
she sees a keyword advertisement, she makes decision whether or not to click it; two, if she clicks on
the advertisement, she can take any one of the following two actions – make a purchase or not make a
purchase.
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Thus, there are three types of observations. First, a person clicked through and made a purchase. The
probability of such an event is pijqij. Second, a person clicked through but did not make a purchase. The
probability of such an event is pij(1- qij). Third, an impression did not lead to a click-through or
purchase. The probability of such an event is 1- pij. Then, the probability of observing (nij, mij) is given
by:
f (nij , mij , pij , qij ) =

N ij !
mij !(nij − mij )!( N ij − nij )!

n − mij

{ pij qij } ij { pij (1 − qij )} ij
m

{1 − pij }

N ij − nij

(4.1)

4.2 Modeling the Consumer’s Decision: Click-through
Prior work (Broder 2002, Jansen and Spink 2007) has analyzed the goals for users’ web searches and
classified user queries in search engines into three categories of searches: navigational (for example, a
search query consisting of a specific firm or retailer), transactional (for example, a search query consisting
of a specific product) or informational (for example, a search query consisting of longer words). Being
cognizant of such user behavior, search engines not only sell non-branded or generic keywords as
advertisements, but also well-known product or manufacturer brand names as well as keywords
indicating the specific advertiser in order for the firm to attract consumers to its website.4 Moreover,
advertisers also have the option of making the keyword advertisement either generic or specific by
altering the number of words contained in the keyword. Finally, the length of the keyword is also an
important determinant of search and purchase behavior but anecdotal evidence on this varies across
trade press reports. Some studies have shown that the percentage of searchers who use a combination
of keywords is 1.6 times the percentage of those who use single-keyword queries (Kilpatrick 2003). In
contrast, another study found that single-keywords have on average the highest number of unique
visitors (Oneupweb 2005). In our data, the average length of a keyword is about 2.6. In sum, the
number of advertisers placing a bid, which can affect the number of clicks received by a given ad, will
vary based on the kind of keyword that is advertised. Hence, we focus on the three important keywordspecific characteristics for the firm when it advertises on a search engine: Brand, Retailer and Length. The
click-through probability is likely to be influenced by the position of the ad (Rank), how specific or
broad the keyword is (Length), and whether is contains any retailer-specific (Retailer) or brand-specific
information (Brand). Hence, in equation (4.1), pij the click-through probability is modeled as:
For example, a consumer seeking to purchase a digital camera is as likely to search for a popular manufacturer brand name
such as NIKON, CANON or KODAK on a search engine as searching for the generic phrase “digital camera”. Similarly,
the same consumer may also search for a retailer such as “BEST BUY” or “CIRCUIT CITY” in order to buy the digital
camera directly from the retailer

4
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pij =

exp( β i 0 + β i1 Rankij + α 1 Retaileri + α 2 Brandi + α 3 Lengthi + α 4 Timeij + ε ij )
1 + exp( β i 0 + β i1 Rankij + α 1 Retaileri + α 2 Brandi + α 3 Lengthi + α 4 Timeij + ε ij )

(4.2)

We capture the unobserved heterogeneity with a random coefficient on the intercept by allowing βi0 to
vary along its population mean β 0 as follows:

βi 0 = β0 + ς iβ0

(4.3)

We also allow the Rank coefficient of the ith keyword to vary along the population mean β 1 and the
keywords’ characteristics as follows:
β i1 = β1 + γ 1Retaileri + γ 2 Brand i + γ 3 Lengthi + ς iβ1

(4.4)

⎛ ⎡0⎤ ⎡ Σ11β Σ12β ⎤ ⎞
⎡ς iβ0 ⎤
⎟
⎜ ⎢ ⎥, ⎢
~
MVN
⎢ β⎥
⎜ ⎣0 ⎦ Σ β Σ β ⎥ ⎟
ς
22 ⎦ ⎠
⎣ i1 ⎦
⎣ 21
⎝

(4.5)

4.3 Modeling the Consumer’s Decision: Conversion
Next we model the conversion rates. Prior work (Brooks 2005) has shown that there is an
intrinsic trust value associated with the rank of a firm’s listing on a search engine, which could lead to
the conversion rate dropping significantly with an increase in the rank (i.e., with a lower position on the
screen). Another factor that can influence conversion rates is the quality of the landing page of the
advertiser’s website. Anecdotal evidence suggests that if online consumers use a search engine to direct
them to a product but don’t see it addressed adequately on the landing page, they are likely to abandon
their search and purchase process. Different keywords from a given advertiser lead to different kinds of
landing pages. Hence, it is important to incorporate the landing page quality as a covariate in the model.
Furthermore, different keywords are associated with different products. It is possible that productspecific characteristics influence consumer conversion rates, and thus, it is important to control for the
unobserved product characteristics that may influence conversion rates once the consumer is on the
website of the advertiser. Hence, we include the three keyword characteristics to proxy for the
unobserved keyword heterogeneity stemming from the different products sold by the advertiser. Thus,
the conversion probability is likely to be influenced by the position of the ad on the screen, the three
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keyword specific characteristics, and the landing page quality score. These factors lead us to model the
conversion probabilities as follows:
qij =

exp( θ i 0 + θ i1 Rankij + δ 1 Retaileri + δ 2 Brandi + δ 3 Lengthi + δ 4 Landing Page Qualityi + δ 5Timeij + ηij )
1 + exp( θ i 0 + θ i1 Rankij + δ 1 Retaileri + δ 2 Brand i + δ 3 Lengthi + δ 4 Landing Page Qualityi + δ 5Timeij + ηij )

(4.6)

As before, we capture the unobserved heterogeneity with a random coefficient specified on both the
intercept and the Rank coefficient, as follows:

θ i 0 = θ 0 + ς iθ0

(4.7)

θi1 = θ1 + κ 1 Retaileri + κ 2 Brandi + κ 3 Lengthi + κ 4 Landing Page Qualityi + ς iθ1

(4.8)

⎛ ⎡0⎤ ⎡ Σθ11
⎡ς iθ0 ⎤
⎜ ⎢ ⎥, ⎢
~
MVN
⎢ θ⎥
⎜ ⎣0 ⎦ Σ θ
⎣ς i1 ⎦
⎣ 21
⎝

(4.9)

Σθ12 ⎤ ⎞
⎥⎟
Σθ22 ⎦ ⎟⎠

Thus, equations (4.1) - (4.9) model the demand for a keyword, i.e. consumer’s decision.
4.4 Modeling the Advertiser’s Decision – Cost Per Click
Next, we model the advertiser’s (i.e., the firm’s) strategic behavior. The advertiser has to decide on how
much to bid for each keyword i in week j and thus the cost per click (CPC) that it is willing to incur.5
The advertiser decides on it CPC by tracking the performance of a keyword over time such that the
current CPC is dependent on past performance of that keyword.6 Specifically, the keyword’s current
CPC is a function of the rank of the same keyword in the previous period. In keeping with the
institutional practices of Google which decides the minimum bid price of any given keyword ad as a
function of landing page quality associated with that keyword, we control for the landing page quality in
the advertiser’s CPC decision. Different keyword attributes determine the extent of competitiveness in
the bidding process for that keyword as can be seen in the number of advertisers who place a bid. For
example, a ‘retailer’ keyword is likely to be far less competitive since the specific advertiser is usually the
only firm that will bid on such a keyword. On the other hand, ‘branded’ keywords are likely to be much
more competitive since there are several advertisers (retailers who sell that brand) who will bid on that
keyword. Similarly, smaller keywords typically tend to indicate more generic ads and are likely to be
much more competitive whereas longer keywords typically tend to indicate more specific ads, and are
5 Since we do not have data on actual bids, we use the actual cost-per-click (CPC) as a proxy for the bid price. According to
the firm whose data we use, they are very strongly correlated, and hence it’s a very reasonable proxy.
6 This information about current bids being based on past performance (lagged rank) was given to us by the advertiser. The
qualitative nature of all our results are robust to the use of both lagged rank and lagged profits from a given keyword ad.
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likely to be less competitive. Hence, the advertiser’s CPC for a given keyword also depends on the three
keyword attributes. Thus, the CPC will be influenced by the rank of the ad in the previous time period,
the three keyword specific characteristics, and the landing page quality. This leads to the following
equation:
ln( CPCij ) = ωi 0 + ωi1 Ranki , j −1 + λ1 Retaileri + λ2 Brandi + λ3 Lengthi +

λ4 Landing Page Qualityi + λ5Timeij + µij

(4.10)

ω i 0 = ω 0 + ς iω0

(4.11)

ωi1 = ω1 + ρ11 Retaileri + ρ12 Brandi + ρ13 Lengthi + ρ14 Landing Page Qualityi + ς iω1

(4.12)

ωi 2 = ω2 + ρ 21 Retaileri + ρ 22 Brandi + ρ 23 Lengthi + ρ 24 Landing Page Qualityi + ς iω2

(4.13)

The error terms in equations (4.11) – (4.13) are distributed as follows:
ω
ω
⎛ ⎡0⎤ ⎡ Σ11
⎡ς iω0 ⎤
Σ12
⎜
⎢ ω⎥
⎢ ⎥⎢ ω
ω
⎢ς i1 ⎥ ~ MVN ⎜ ⎢0⎥, ⎢Σ 21 Σ 22
⎜⎜
ω
⎢ς iω2 ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎢ ω
⎣ ⎦
⎝ ⎣0⎦ ⎣Σ31 Σ32

ω
⎤⎞
Σ13
⎥⎟
Σω23 ⎥ ⎟
⎟
Σω33 ⎥⎦ ⎟⎠

(4.14)

4.5 Modeling the Search Engine’s Decision – Keyword Rank
Finally, we model the search engine’s decision on assigning ranks for a sponsored keyword
advertisement. During the auction, search engines like Google, MSN and Yahoo decide on the keyword
rank by taking into account both the current CPC bid and a ‘Quality Score’ that is determined by the
prior click-through rate (CTR) of that keyword (Varian 2007, Athey and Ellison 2008) amongst other
factors. Since more recent CTR is given higher weightage by the search engine in computing this score,
we use the one period lagged value of CTR. The three keyword attributes are used to control for
unobserved characteristics such as the extent of competition in the auction bidding process as before in
the CPC decision. Hence the rank is modeled as being dependent on these three keyword attributes.
This leads to the following equation for the Rank of a keyword in sponsored search:
ln( Rankij ) = φi 0 + φi1CPCi , j + φ2 CTRi , j −1 + τ 1 Retaileri + τ 2 Brandi + τ 3 Lengthi + τ 4 Timeij + ν ij

(4.15)

φi 0 = φ0 + ς iφ0

(4.16)

φi1 = φ1 + π 1 Retaileri + π 2 Brandi + π 3 Lengthi + ς iπ1

(4.17)
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The error terms in equations (4.16) and (4.17) are distributed as follows:
φ
φ
⎛ ⎡0⎤ ⎡ Σ11
⎡ς iφ0 ⎤
⎤⎞
Σ12
⎟
⎢ φ ⎥ ~ MVN ⎜⎜ ⎢ ⎥, ⎢ φ
φ ⎥⎟
0
ς
Σ
Σ
⎣
⎦
22 ⎦ ⎠
⎣ 21
⎣ i1 ⎦
⎝

(4.18)

Finally, to model the unobserved co-variation among click-through, conversions, CPC bid and the
keyword ranking, we let the four error terms to be correlated in the following manner:
⎛ ⎡0⎤ ⎡ Ω11 Ω12
⎡ ε ij ⎤
⎜⎢ ⎥ ⎢
⎢η ⎥
⎢ ij ⎥ ~ MVN ⎜ ⎢0⎥, ⎢Ω 21 Ω 22
⎜ ⎢0⎥ ⎢ Ω
⎢ µ ij ⎥
Ω 32
⎜ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ 31
⎢ ⎥
⎜ 0 Ω
⎣⎢ν ij ⎦⎥
⎝ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ 41 Ω 42

Ω13
Ω 23
Ω 33
Ω 43

Ω14 ⎤ ⎞
⎟
Ω 24 ⎥⎥ ⎟
Ω 34 ⎥ ⎟
⎥⎟
Ω 44 ⎦ ⎟⎠

(4.19)

A couple of clarifications are useful to note here. First, the three characteristics of a keyword (Retailer,
Brand, Length) are all mean centered. This means that β1 is the average effect of β i1 in equation (4.4). A
similar interpretation applies to the parameters θi1 , ωi1 , ωi 2 and φi1 . Second, in equations (4.2), (4.6),
(4.11) and (4.15), we have controlled for the temporal effects by estimating time-period effects that
captures unobserved industry dynamics.
4.6 Identification
To ensure that the model is fully identified even with sparse data (data in which a large proportion of
observations are zero), we conduct the following simulation. We picked a set of parameter values, and
generated the number of click-throughs, the number of purchases, CPC bid, and ranking for each
keyword, which mimicked their actual observed values in the data according to the model and the
actual independent variables observed in our data. We then estimated the proposed model with the
simulated dataset and found that we were able to recover the true parameter values. This relieves a
potential concern on empirical identification of the model due to the sparseness of the data.
In order to show any endogeneity issues and the identification of the proposed system of simultaneous
equation model, we provide a sketch of the model below. Note that our proposed model boils down to
the following simultaneous equations:
p = f1 ( Rank , X 1 , ε 1 )

(4.20)

q = f 2 ( Rank , X 2 , ε 2 ) Conditional on the number of click-throughs > 0

(4.21)

CPC = f 3 ( X 3 , ε 3 )

(4.22)
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Rank = f 4 (CPC , X 4 , ε 4 )

(4.23)

Here p is the click-through probability, q is the conversion probability conditional on click-through,
CPC is cost per click and Rank is the position of a keyword in the listing. X1 – X4 are the exogenous
covariates corresponding to the four equations. ε1 − ε 4 are the error terms associated with the four
equations, respectively. These error terms are mainly capturing information that is observed by the
decision makers (consumer, advertiser, and search engine) but not observed by the researcher. Further,
if ε 1 or ε 2 is correlated with ε 4 , “Rank” will be endogenous. If ε 3 is correlated with ε 4 , “CPC” will be
endogenous.
Our proposed simultaneous model closely resembles the triangular system in standard econometric
textbooks (Lahiri and Schmidt 1978, Greene 1999). To see this more clearly, CPC is modeled as
exogenously determined (modeled as the advertiser’s decision and a function of the advertiser’s past
performance with the same keyword and other keyword related characteristics). CPC, in turn, affects
the search engine’s ranking decision, and finally Rank affects both click-through and the conversion
probabilities. As shown in Lahiri and Schmidt (1978) and discussed in Greene (1999), a triangular
system of simultaneous equations can be identified without any further identification constraint such as
nonlinearity or correlation restriction. In particular, the identification of such a triangular system comes
from the likelihood function. This is also noted by Hausman (1975) who observes that in a triangular
system, the Jacobian term in the likelihood function vanishes so that the likelihood function is the same
as for the usual seemingly unrelated regressions problem (Hausman 1975). Hence, a GLS (generalized
least squares) or SURE (seemingly unrelated regression) based estimation leads to uniquely identified
estimates in a triangular system with a full covariance on error terms Lahiri and Schmidt (1978).
We also provide the parameters produced by the estimation of this system under the assumption of
diagonality (restricting covariance elements to be zero) in order to be able to compare them to the
generalized results. These are given in the tables in Appendix B. These estimates show that it is
important to control for endogeneity since the parameter estimates are attenuated when we restrict the
covariance elements to be zero, and thus biased. For example, in the case of estimating CTR and
conversion rates, the parameter estimates on Rank are much closer to zero under the assumption of
diagonality than otherwise. Similarly, in the case of estimating Rank, the parameter estimates on
Lag_CTR and CPC are significantly closer to zero under the assumption of diagonality than otherwise.
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Note that the conversion probability q is only defined when the number of click-throughs is greater
than zero. In this case, if ε1 and ε 2 are correlated as in our data, then the conditional mean of ε 2
conditional on a positive click-through probability is not going to be zero. Then, a model in which one
only looks at the conversion conditional on positive number of click-throughs (i.e. does not model the
click-through behavior simultaneously) is going to suffer from the selection bias. By jointly modeling
click-through and conversion behavior, our proposed model accounts for such selectivity issues. The
proposed Bayesian estimation approach also offers a computationally convenient way to deal with the
selectivity problem by augmenting the unobserved click-through intention when there are no clicks.

5. Empirical Analysis
Next, we discuss our empirical findings. We first discuss the effects of various keyword characteristics
and keyword ranking on click-through rates of the sponsored search advertisements.
5.1 Results
The coefficient of Retailer in Table 2a is positive and significant indicating that keyword advertisements
that contain retailer-specific information lead to a significant increase in click-through rates. Specifically,
this corresponds to a 14.72% increase in click-through rates with the presence of retailer information.
Further, the coefficient of Brand in Table 2a is negative and significant indicating that keyword
advertisements that contain brand-specific information can lead to a 56.6 % decrease in click-through
rates. These results are useful for managers because they imply that keyword advertisements that
explicitly contain information identifying the advertiser lead to higher click-through rates while those
that explicitly contain information identifying the brand lead to lower click-through rates than
keywords which lack such information. On the other hand, the coefficient of Length in Table 2a is
negative suggesting that longer keywords typically tend to experience lower click-through rates.
Specifically, we find that all else equal an increase in the length of the keyword by one word is
associated with a decrease in the click-through rates by 13.9%.
= = Insert Tables 2a and 2b = =
Intuitively, this result has an interesting implication if one were to tie this result with those in the
literature on consideration sets in marketing. A longer keyword typically tends to suggest a more
‘directed’ or ‘specific’ search whereas a shorter keyword typically suggests a more generic search. That
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is, the shorter the keyword is, the less information it likely carries and the larger context should be
supplied to focus the search (Finkelstein et al. 2001). This implies that the consideration set for the
consumer is likely to shrink as the search term becomes ‘narrower’ in scope. Danaher & Mullarkey
(2003) show that user involvement during search (whether the use is in a purchasing or surfing mode)
plays a crucial role in the effectiveness of online banner ads. Since the consumers in our data get to see
the ads displayed by all the retailers who are bidding for that keyword at the time of the search, the
probability of a goal-directed consumer clicking on the retailer’s advertisement decreases unless the
retailer carries the specific product that the consumer is searching for. In contrast, a consumer who
does not have a goal-directed search (has a wider consideration set) and is in the surfing mode, is likely
to click on several advertising links before she finds a product that induces a purchase.
Some additional substantive results are as expected. Rank has an overall negative relationship with CTR
in Table 2a. This implies that lower the rank of the advertisement (i.e., higher the location of the
sponsored ad on the computer screen), higher is the click-through rate. The position of the
advertisement link on the search engine page clearly plays an important role in influencing click-through
rates. This kind of primacy effect is consistent with other empirical studies of the online world. Ansari
& Mela (2003) suggested a positive relationship between the serial position of a link in an email and
recipients' clicks on that link. Similarly, Drèze & Zufryden (2004) implied a positive relationship
between a link's serial position and site visibility. Brooks (2004) showed that the higher the link’s
placement in the results listing, the more likely a searcher is to select it. In the context of shopping
search engines, Baye at al. (2008) find that there is a 17.5% drop in click-through rates when a retailer is
move down one position on the screen. Thus, ceteris paribus, website designers and online advertising
managers would place their most desirable links toward the top of a web page or email and their least
desirable links toward the bottom of the web page or email. A robustness test wherein we include a
quadratic term for Rank highlight that the negative relationship between CTR and Rank increases at a
decreasing rate. This finding has useful implications for managers interested in quantifying the impact
of Rank on CTR.
When we consider the interaction effect of these variables on the relationship of Rank with clickthrough rates, we find that keywords that contain retailer-specific or brand-specific information lead to
an increase in the negative relationship between Rank and CTR. That is, for keywords that contain
retailer-specific or brand-specific information, a lower rank (better placement) leads to even higher
click-through rates. On the other hand, we find that the coefficient of Length is statistically insignificant
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suggesting that longer keywords do not seem to affect the negative relationship between click-through
rates and ranks. As shown in Table 2b, the estimated unobserved heterogeneity covariance is significant
including all of its elements. This suggests that the baseline click-through rates and the way that
keyword ranking predicts the click-through rates are different across keywords, driven by unobserved
factors beyond the three observed keyword characteristics.
Next consider Tables 3a and 3b with findings on conversion rates. Our analysis reveals that the
coefficient of Brand, δ2, is negative and significant indicating that keywords that contain information
specific to a brand (either product-specific or manufacturer-specific) experience lower conversion rates
on an average. Specifically, the presence of brand information in the keyword decreases conversion
rates by 44.2%. Similarly, the presence of retailer information in the keyword increases conversion
rates by 50.6%. In contrast, Length is not statistically significant in its overall effect on conversion rates.
We find a significant relationship between Rank and conversion rates such that lower the Rank (i.e., higher
the sponsored keyword on the screen), higher is the Conversion Rate. A decrease in the rank from the
maximum possible position or worst case scenario (which is 131 in our data) to the minimum position
or best case scenario (which is 1 in our data) increases conversion rates by 92.5%. This finding can have
an important implication for existing theoretical models in the domain of sponsored search advertising
which have typically assumed that the value per click to an advertiser is uniform across all ranks. Our
estimates suggest that the value per click is not uniform and motivates future theoretical models that
modify the common assumption of uniformity in click values and re-examine the social welfare
maximizing properties of generalized second price keyword auctions like those in Google.
The inclusion of a quadratic term for Rank highlights that the negative relationship between Conversion
Rates and Rank increases at a decreasing rate. This finding is relatively new in the literature on online
advertising. As speculated in trade press reports, our analysis empirically confirms that Landing Page
Quality has a positive relationship with conversation rates. To be precise, an increase in landing page
quality score from the lowest possible score (equal to 1) to the highest possible score (equal to 10) is
associated with an increase in the conversion rates by 22.5%. These analyses suggest that in terms of
magnitude, the rank of a keyword on the search engine has a larger impact on conversion rates than the
quality of the landing pages.
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When we consider the effect of these keyword characteristics on the relationship of Rank with
Conversion Rates, we find that none of the keyword attributes have a statistically significant effect on the
relationship between rank and conversion rates. As shown in Table 3b, the estimated unobserved
heterogeneity covariance is significant including all of its elements. This suggests that the baseline
conversion rates and the way that keyword ranking predicts the conversion rates are different across
keywords, driven by unobserved factors.
= = Insert Tables 3a and 3b = =
Next, we turn to firms’ behavior. Interestingly, the analysis of cost-per-click reveals that there is a
negative relationship between CPC and Retailer, but a positive relationship between CPC and Brand.
This implies that the firm incurs a lower cost per click for advertisements that contain retailer
information and higher cost per click for those advertisements that contain brand information. This is
consistent with theoretical predictions because Retailer keywords are far less competitive than Brand
keywords, on an average. While Length does not have a direct statistically significant effect on CPC, it
indirectly affects CPC through the interaction with Rank. There is a negative and statistically significant
relationship between CPC and Landing Page Quality, implying that advertisers tend to place lower bid
prices on keywords that lead to landing pages with higher quality. Further, there is a negative
relationship between CPC and Lag Rank. These results are indicative of the fact that while there is some
learning exhibited by the firm, it may not necessarily be bidding optimally.
= = Insert Tables 4a and 4b = =
Finally, on the analysis of Rank, we find that all three covariates-Retailer, Brand and Length have a
statistically significant and negative relationship with Rank, suggesting that the search keywords that
have retailer-specific information or brand-specific information or are more specific in their scope
generally tend to have lower ranks (i.e., they are listed higher up on the search engine results screen).
How do search engines decide on the final rank? Anecdotal evidence and public disclosures by Google
suggest that it incorporates a performance criterion along with bid price when determining the ranking
of the advertisers. The advertiser in the top position might be willing to pay a higher price per click
than the advertiser in the second position, but there is no guarantee that its ad will be displayed in the
first slot. This is because past performance such as prior click-through rates are factored in by Google
before the final ranks are published. The coefficients of CPC and Lag CTR are negative and statistically
significant in our data. Thus, our results from the estimation of the Rank equation confirm that the
search engine is indeed incorporating both the current CPC bid and the previous click-through rates in
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determining the final rank of a keyword. Note from Table 5a that the coefficient of CPC is almost twice
the coefficient of Lag CTR, suggesting that the cost-per-click factor has a much larger role to play in
determining the final rank.
= = Insert Tables 5a and 5b = =
Finally, it is worth noting in Table 6 that the unobserved covariance between (i) click-through
propensity and keyword rank, (ii) between conversion propensity and keyword rank, and (iii) between
CPC and keyword rank all turn out to be statistically significant. This suggests the endogenous nature
of CPC and Rank. Therefore, it is important to simultaneously model the consumer’s click-through and
purchase behavior, and the advertiser’s and search engine’s decisions.
= = Insert Table 6 = =
As mentioned before, we provide the parameter estimates produced by the estimation of this system
under the assumption of diagonality (restricting covariance elements to be zero) to the generalized
results. Refer tables in Appendix B. These estimates further demonstrate that it is important to control
for endogeneity since the parameter estimates are attenuated when we restrict the covariance elements
to be zero, and thus biased.
5.2 Robustness Tests
Our results are robust to several different checks. We provide below a selected list of tests we have
carried out. None of these make any change in the qualitative nature of our results. Results are omitted
for brevity but are available from the authors on request.
(i)

We have collected data on the average and maximum bid prices of the potential competitors of
this firm from Google Keywords and Microsoft Ad Center who placed bids on the same set of
keywords, and used them as controls in the CPC and Rank equations.

(ii)

We have used the data on actual bid prices instead of the CPC for this advertiser for the same
sample of keywords. Given the very high correlation of 0.95 between bid prices and CPC, our
results are robust to this.

(iii)

We have data on CPC of this advertiser on Yahoo and Microsoft, and we use them as
additional controls. This helps controls for correlated keyword strategies across search engines
for a given advertiser.
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(iv)

In addition to the linear term for Rank in the CTR and conversion rate equations, we have used
a quadratic term as well in order to account for the fact that changes in CTR and conversion
with rank may sometimes be non-linear.

(v)

We have use the lagged values of profits in the CPC equation to account for the fact that the
advertiser may use previous profits as an additional heuristic to place its bids in lieu of or in
addition to using the lagged value of the CTR as the main heuristic to decide on its CPC.

(vi)

We have used the product price as a control variable in the conversion rate equation in the
event that it might influence the propensity to buy after clicking on an ad.

6. Managerial Implications and Conclusion
The phenomenon of sponsored search advertising is gaining ground as the largest source of revenues
for search engines. In this research, we focus on analyzing the relationship between different keyword
level covariates and different metrics of sponsored search advertisement performance taking both
consumer and firm behavior into account. Our data reveals that there is a considerable amount of
heterogeneity in terms of the profitability of various keywords accruing from significant differences in
the decision metrics of the various players – consumers, advertisers and search engines.
Arguably, the mix of retailer-specific and brand-specific keywords in an online advertiser's portfolio has
some analogies to other kinds of marketing mix decisions faced by firms in many markets. For instance,
typically it is the retailer who engages in ‘retail store’ advertising that has a relatively 'monopolistic'
market. In contrast, typically it is the manufacturer who engages in advertising ‘national-brands’. From
the retailer’s perspective, these brand-specific advertisements are likely to be relatively more
'competitive' since national brands are likely to be stocked by its competitors too. Retailer-name
searches are navigational searches, and are analogous to a user finding the retailer's or address in the
White Pages. These searches are driven by brand awareness generated by catalog mailings, TV ads, etc,
and are likely to have come from more ‘loyal’ consumers. Even though the referral to the retailer’s
website came through a search engine, the search engine had very little to do with generating the
demand in the first place. On the other hand, searches on product or manufacturer specific brand
names are analogous to consumers going to the Yellow Pages—they know they need a branded
product, but don't yet know where to buy it (Kaufman 2007). These are likely to be “competitive”
searches. If the advertiser wins the click and the order, that implies they have taken market share away
from a competitor. Thus, retailer-specific keywords are likely to be searched for and clicked by 'loyal'
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consumers who are inclined towards buying from that retailer whereas brand-specific keywords are
likely to be searched for and clicked by the 'shoppers’ who can easily switch to competition. This would
suggest that advertisers experience higher conversion rates on retailer-specific keywords and relatively
lower conversion rates on brand-specific keywords, a feature that we also observe in our data.
Our results provide some managerial insights for an advertiser of sponsoring such retail store
keywords (retailer-specific keywords) with national-brand keywords (brand-specific keywords). Most
firms who sponsor online keyword advertisements set a daily budget, select a set of keywords,
determine a bid price for each keyword, and designate an ad associated with each selected keyword. If
the company’s spending has exceeded its daily budget, however, its ads will not be displayed. With
millions of available keywords and a highly uncertain click-through rate associated with each keyword,
identifying the most profitable set of keywords given the daily budget constraint becomes challenging
for firms (Rusmevichientong & Williamson 2006). The analyses of keyword content on conversion
rates also provide insights into the cost per conversion and the value per click of different keywords.
Such specific knowledge of acquisition costs at the keyword can also help advertisers re-optimize their
keyword advertisement portfolio in the event that search engines enable a pay-per-conversion model in
addition to a pay-per-click model as Google has recently adopted.
By quantifying the impact of landing page quality on product conversions and cost per click of
advertising, and comparing it to the impact of keyword attributes on these variables and rank, our study
can help managers make better decisions regarding investments in the online advertising domain.
Appropriate investments in landing page quality in order to improve the ranking in paid search can also
boost the organic rankings of that retailer for a given set of keywords. This is because organic rankings
of advertisers’ websites are based on a complex and proprietary indexing algorithm devised by the
search engine involving the quality of the landing page and the website's “relative importance” with
respect to other links. This can be important because of claims in the trade press that more people will
visit an advertiser’s website if it is listed in both paid and organic listings because there is a "second
opinion effect" (iCrossing 2007). This happens because searchers are encouraged by the fact that a
website is listed in both the organic listings and paid ads leading to higher click-through rates.
Our results have some similarities with the findings in the context of traditional media advertising in
offline markets. Koschat and Putsis (2002) attempt to estimate the effect of unbundling in magazine
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advertising. They find that in terms of the pricing of magazine advertising space targeting specific
reader segments is generally preferable to offering advertisers all its readers. This is consistent with our
finding that advertisers have to incur a higher cost per click for brand specific keywords (that are
relatively more targeted) compared to generic keywords that do not highlight the manufacturer or
product brand. Wilbur (2007) empirically examines the determinants of television advertising pricing to
estimate viewer demand for programs, and advertiser demand for audiences. His results suggest that
advertiser preferences influence network choices more strongly than viewer preferences. This has an
interesting parallel to our finding that search engines place a higher weightage on advertisers’ bid prices
relative to consumer click-through rates in deciding their choice of rank for a given ad. Using
circulation data for US daily newspapers, Chandra (2008) shows that newspapers facing more
competition have lower circulation prices but higher advertising prices than similar newspapers facing
little or no competition. This corresponds well with our finding that advertisers tend to incur a higher
cost-per-click on longer keywords (narrower searches) and is consistent with a story of targeted
advertising. In the context of selling medical services, Tellis et al. (2001) find that effective TV ads that
generate referrals may not necessarily be profitable too. This is very consistent with our data that
suggests that keyword ads that generate higher click-through rates may also have lower profits (due to a
higher cost per click and lower revenues) in comparison to other ads. It is also important for sponsored
search advertisers to keep in mind that even if keyword clicks do not lead to immediate conversions in
the short run, the mere act of repetitive exposure of a stimulus can increase the familiarity with the
brand name and lead to a preference (Tellis 2004), which in turn enhances the effectiveness of future
advertising. In other words, sponsored advertising can contribute to building equity for the brand or for
the retailer, and thus generate a longer term business value.
Our estimates from the conversion rate equation show that an advertiser’s relative value-per-click for
each slot is not uniform. Instead, they are decreasing across slots, meaning that clicks from lower
ranked slots are more valuable than clicks from higher ranked slots. Prior work (Edelman et al. 2006,
Varian 2007) showed that in a model where all clicks on an ad gain the advertiser the same value,
generalized second price (GSP) keyword auction maximizes the social welfare in equilibrium. Given
that the probability that a click will convert to a sale for the advertiser depends on the position (rank) of
the ad, the equilibrium results of (Aggarwal et al. 2006, Edelman et al. 2006, Varian 2007) do not hold.
A conclusion can be made for pay-per-click online advertising that the value generated by clicks may
vary due to various reasons and that this should be taken into account in the design of the advertising
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mechanism. There have been many theoretical papers advocating alternative auction formats for slot
auctions (Aggarwal et al. 2006, Athey and Ellison 2008) and focusing on new mechanisms with good
equilibrium properties. Our empirical results can thus pave the way for future theoretical models in this
domain that could relax assumptions to design newer mechanisms with more robust equilibrium
properties. The recent theoretical work by Borgers et al. (2007) is a step in this direction.
Our paper has several limitations. These limitations arise primarily from the lack of information in our
data. For example, we do not have precise data on competition since our data is limited to one firm.
That is, we do not know the keyword ranks or other performance metrics of keyword advertisements
of the competitors of the firm whose data we have used in this paper. Further, we do not have any
knowledge of other information that was mentioned in the textual description in the space following a
paid advertisement during consumers’ search queries. Future work could integrate that information
with our modeling approach to have more precise estimates. In addition, future work could examine
product specific characteristics to see how different kinds of products affect the click-through and
conversion rates in different ways. This will help firms analyze which brands or products have higher
conversions and lower costs per conversion. Another area for future work is to study whether keyword
advertising acts like a coupon by always inducing an immediate purchase or more like a regular ad that
can induce a delayed purchase as shown by prior work in traditional media (Weiss and Tellis 1995). This
analysis requires access to consumer level data that captures whether exposure to a sponsored ad in one
time period resulted in a conversion in a later time period. Finally another area of future research could
be to examine the strategic interactions of search engines in allocating ranks for different firms who
vary in their experience level in the auction process. We hope that this study will generate further
interest in exploring this important and emerging inter-disciplinary area.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Paid Search Data (N=9664)
Variable
Impressions
Clicks
Orders
Click-through Rate (CTR)
Conversion Rate
Cost-per-Click (CPC)
Lag Rank
Log(Lag Profit)
Rank
Lag CTR
Retailer
Brand
Length
Landing Page Quality

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

411.694
46.266
0.860
0.156
0.023
0.245
6.473
0.026
6.926
0.154
0.076
0.427
2.632
8.556

2441.488
716.812
11.891
0.262
0.132
0.181
9.139
1.726
10.027
0.250
0.265
0.494
0.755
1.434

1
0
0
0
0
0.001
1
-5.210
1
0
0
0
1
4

97424
38465
644
1
1
1.46
131
11.280
131
1
1
1
6
10
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Table 2a: Coefficient Estimates on Click-through Rate
Intercept

Retailer

Brand

Length

β0

α1

α2

α3

-1.654
(0.063)

1.290
(0.124)

-0.299
(0.065)

-0.106
(0.045)

γ1

γ2

γ3

Rank

β1
-0.264
(0.017)

-0.205
(0.031)

-0.049
(0.018)

-0.004
(0.010)

Time

α4

Intercept

0.051
(0.003)
Table 2b: Unobserved Heterogeneity Estimates in the Click-through Model ( Σ β )

βi0
(Intercept)

β i1 (Rank)

β i 0 (Intercept)

β i1 (Rank)

1.053

-0.095

(0.078)

(0.014)

-0.095
(0.014)

0.035
(0.004)

Note: Posterior means and posterior standard deviations (in the parenthesis) are reported, and
estimates that are significant at 95% are bolded in Tables 2a - 7.
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Table 3a: Coefficient Estimates on Conversion Rate

Intercept

Rank

Intercept

Retailer

Brand

Length

Landing Page
Quality

θ0

δ1

δ2

δ3

δ4

-4.457
(0.097)

1.123
(0.234)

-0.879
(0.136)

-0.041
(0.110)

0.152
(0.066)

θ1
-0.282
(0.031)

κ1

κ2

κ3

κ4

-0.032
(0.089)

0.014
(0.036)

0.012
(0.023)

0.013
(0.014)

δ5
Time

0.067
(0.009)

Table 3b: Unobserved Heterogeneity Estimates in the Conversion Model ( Σθ )

θ i 0 (Intercept)

θ i1 (Rank)

θ i 0 (Intercept)

1.436
(0.285)

-0.131
(0.030)

θ i1 (Rank)

-0.131
(0.030)

0.058
(0.007)

Table 4a: Coefficient Estimates on CPC

Intercept

LagRank

Intercept

Retailer

Brand

Length

Landing
Page
Quality

ω0

λ1

λ2

λ3

λ4

-1.660
(0.024)

-0.760
(0.069)

0.139
(0.032)

-0.022
(0.023)

-0.036
(0.016)

ω1
-0.041
(0.005)

ρ11

ρ12

ρ13

ρ14

0.036
(0.010)

-0.008
(0.008)

0.018
(0.005)

-0.001
(0.004)
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Time

λ6
-0.020
(0.001)

Table 4b: Unobserved Heterogeneity Estimates in the CPC Model ( Σω )

ωi 0 (Intercept) ω i1 (LagRank)
ωi 0 (Intercept)

0.555
(0.030)

-0.021
(0.005)

ωi1 (LagRank)

-0.021
(0.005)

0.011
(0.001)
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Table 5a: Coefficient Estimates on Keyword Rank
Intercept

Retailer

Brand

Length

φ0

τ1

τ2

τ3

1.954
(0.031)

-0.213
(0.075)

-0.279
(0.037)

-0.172
(0.030)

π1

π2

π3

CPC

φ1
-2.028
(0.093)

0.361
(0.306)

0.185
(0.108)

-0.003
(0.085)

Lag_CTR

φ2
-1.289
(0.046)

Intercept

τ5

Time

0.031
(0.001)

Table 5b: Unobserved Heterogeneity Estimates in the Keyword Rank Model ( Σθ )

φ0 (Intercept)

φ1 (CPC)

φ0 (Intercept)

1.020
(0.048)

-1.677
(0.108)

φ1 (CPC)

-1.677
(0.108)

4.073
(0.294)
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Table 6: Estimated Covariance across Click-through, Conversion, CPC and Rank ( Ω )
Click-through

Conversion

CPC

Rank

Click-through

0.956
(0.055)

1.092
(0.086)

-0.082
(0.009)

0.472
(0.022)

Conversion

1.092
(0.086)

2.429
(0.158)

-0.213
(0.021)

0.528
(0.043)

CPC

-0.082
(0.009)

-0.213
(0.021)

0.220
(0.004)

-0.003
(0.005)

Rank

0.472
(0.022)

0.528
(0.043)

-0.003
(0.005)

0.319
(0.007)
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Appendix A: The MCMC Algorithm
We ran the MCMC chain for 40,000 iterations, and used the last 20,000 iterations to compute the
mean and standard deviation of the posterior distribution of the model parameters, in the application
presented in the paper. We report below the MCMC algorithm for the simultaneous model of clickthrough rate, conversion rate, bid price and keyword rank.
1. Draw cijp and cijq
As specified, the likelihood function of the number of clicks ( nij ) and number of purchases ( mij ) is
n − mij

l (cijp , cijq | nij , mij ) ∝ { pij qij } ij { pij (1 − qij )} ij
m

pij =

exp(cijp )
1 + exp(cijp )

,

qij =

exp(cijq )
1 + exp(cijq )

{1 − pij }

N ij − nij

where

.

cijp = mijp + ε ij ,
mijp = β i 0 + β i1 Rank ij + α 1 Retaileri + α 2 Brand i + α 3 Lengthi + α 4Timeij

cijq = mijq + η ij ,
mijq = θ i 0 + θ i1 Rank ij + δ 1 Retaileri + δ 2 Brand i + δ 3 Lengthi + δ 4 LandingPag eQuality i + δ 5Timeij .
We further define the following notations:
*
*
D = Ω11
− Ω12
Ω *22−1Ω*21

Ω 34 ⎤
Ω14 ⎤
⎡Ω
⎡Ω
*
Ω *22 = ⎢ 33
= Ω*21 ' = ⎢ 13
, Ω12
⎥
⎥
⎣Ω 43 Ω 44 ⎦
⎣Ω 23 Ω 24 ⎦
= ln(CPCij ) − (ω i 0 + ω i1 Rank i , j −1 + λ1 Retaileri + λ2 Brand i + λ3 Lengthi +

Ω12 ⎤
⎡Ω
*
Ω11
= ⎢ 11
⎥,
⎣Ω 21 Ω 22 ⎦
u ij1

λ4 LandingPageQualityi + λ5Timeij )
u ij2 = ln( Rank ij ) − (φi 0 + φ i1CPC ij + φ 2 CTRi , j −1 + τ 1 Retaileri + τ 2 Brand i + τ 3 Lengthi + τ 4Timeij )
*
Eij = Ω12
Ω*22−1uij

We use Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with a random walk chain to generate draws of cij = (cijp , cijq )
(see Chib and Greenberg 1995, p330, method 1). Let c ij( p ) denote the previous draw, and then the
next draw c ij( n ) is given by:

c ij( n ) = c ij( p ) + ∆

with the accepting probability α given by:
⎡ exp [ − 1 / 2 ( c ij( n ) − m ij − E ij )' D − 1 ( c ij( n ) − m ij − E ij )]l ( c ij( n ) ) ⎤
,1⎥
min ⎢
( p)
−1
( p)
( p)
⎢⎣ exp [ − 1 / 2 ( c ij − m ij − E ij )' D ( c ij − m ij − E ij )]l ( c ij ) ⎥⎦
∆ is a draw from the density Normal(0, 0.015I) where I is the identity matrix.
2. Draw bi = [ β i ' , θ i ' , ω i ' , φi ' ]'

yij1 = cijp − (α1 Retaileri + α 2 Brandi + α 3 Lengthi + α 4Timeij )

34

yij 2 = cijq − (δ 1 Retaileri + δ 2 Brandi + δ 3 Lengthi + δ 4 LandingPageQualityi + δ 5Timeij )

yij 3 = ln(CPCij ) − (λ1 Retaileri + λ2 Brandi + λ3 Lengthi + λ4 LandingPageQualityi + λ5Timeij )
y ij 4 = ln( Rank ij ) − (φ 2 CTRi , j −1 + τ 1 Retaileri + τ 2 Brand i + τ 3 Lengthi + τ 4Timeij )

0
0 ⎤
⎡ xij1 ' 0
⎡Σ β 0
0
0⎤
⎢ 0 x ' 0
⎥
⎢
⎥
θ
0 ⎥
0 Σ
0
0⎥
ij 2
⎢
⎢
xij =
Σ=
,
⎢ 0
⎢0
0 xij 3 ' 0 ⎥
0 Σω 0 ⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢
⎥
0
0 xij 4 '⎥⎦
0
0 Σφ ⎦⎥
⎣⎢ 0
⎣⎢ 0
xij1 = xij 2 = [1, Rank ij ] , xij 3 = [1, Rank i , j −1 , Profit i , j −1 ]' , xij 4 = [1, CPC ij ]'

bi1 = β 0 , bi 2 = β1 + γ 1 Retaileri + γ 2 Brandi + γ 3 Lengthi
bi 3 = θ 0 , bi 4 = θ1 + κ 1 Retaileri + κ 2 Brandi + κ 3 Lengthi + κ 4 LandingPageQualityi
bi 5 = ω 0 bi 6 = ω1 + ρ11 Retaileri + ρ12 Brand i + ρ13 Lengthi + ρ14 LandingPageQualityi
bi 7 = ω 2 + ρ 21 Retaileri + ρ 22 Brand i + ρ 23 Lengthi + ρ 24 LandingPageQualityi bi 8 = φ0 ,
bi 9 = φ1 + π 1 Retaileri + π 2 Brand i + π 3 Lengthi
Then bi ~ MVN ( Ai , Bi )
Bi = [ xi ' Ω −1 xi + Σ −1 ] −1 , Ai = Bi [ xi ' Ω −1 yi + Σ −1 bi ]

3. Draw a = [α ' , δ ' , λ ' ,φ 2 ,τ ' ]'

yij1 = cijp − ( β i 0 + β i1 Rankij )
yij 2 = cijq − (θ i 0 + θ i1 Rankij )
y ij3 = ln (CPC ij ) − (ω i 0 + ω i1 Rank i , j −1 )
yij4 = ln ( Rank ij ) − (φi 0 + φ i1CPC ij )

0
0 ⎤
⎡ xij1 ' 0
⎢ 0 x ' 0
0 ⎥⎥
ij 2
xij = ⎢
⎢ 0
0 xij 3 ' 0 ⎥
⎢
⎥
0
0 xij 4 '⎥⎦
⎣⎢ 0
xij1 = [ Retaileri , Brand i , Lengthi , Timeij ]
xij 2 = [ Retaileri , Brand i , Lengthi , LandingPag eQuality i , Timeij ]
xij 3 = [ Retaileri , Brand i , Lengthi , LandingPag eQuality i , Time ij ]
xij 4 = [CTR i , j −1 , Retaileri , Brand i , Lengthi , Time ij ]

a = 0 21x1 , Σ 0 = 100 I
Then a ~ MVN ( A, B )
−1

B = [ X ' Ω −1 X + Σ −1 ] −1 , A = B[ X ' Ω −1Y + Σ 0 a0 ]
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4. Draw Ω
yij1 = cijp − ( β i 0 + β i1 Rankij + α1 Retaileri + α 2 Brandi + α 3 Lengthi + α 4Timeij )

yij 2 = cijp − (θ i 0 + θ i1 Rankij + δ 1 Retaileri + δ 2 Brandi + δ 3 Lengthi + δ 4 LandingPageQualityi + δ 5Timeij )
y ij3 = ln(CPCij ) − (ω i 0 + ω i1 Rank i , j −1 + λ1 Retaileri + λ2 Brand i + λ3 Lengthi
+ λ4 LandingPageQualityi + λ5Timeij )
yij 4 = ln( Rankij ) − (φi 0 + φi1CPCij + φ 2 CTRi , j −1 + τ 1 Retaileri + τ 2 Brand i + τ 3 Lengthi + τ 4Timeij )
⎛
Ω ~ IW ⎜⎜ ∑
⎝ i

∑y
j

ij

⎞
' y ij + Q 0 , N + q 0 ⎟⎟ ; Q0 = 10 I and q 0 = 10; N = # of observations
⎠

5. Draw Σ β , Σθ , and Σω
⎛
⎞
Σ β ~ I W ⎜ ∑ ( β i − β ) ' ( β i − β ) + Q 0 , N + q 0 ⎟ ; Q0 = 10 I and q 0 = 10; n = # of keywords
⎝ i
⎠
⎞
⎛
Σ θ ~ I W ⎜ ∑ (θ i − θ ) ' (θ i − θ ) + Q 0 , N + q 0 ⎟ ; Q0 = 10 I and q 0 = 10; n = # of keywords
⎝ i
⎠
⎞
⎛
Σ ω ~ I W ⎜ ∑ (ω i − ω ) ' (ω i − ω ) + Q 0 , N + q 0 ⎟ ; Q0 = 10 I and q 0 = 10; n = # of keywords
⎝ i
⎠
where IW stands for the Inverted Wishart Distribution.
6. Draw f1 = [ β 0 , β1 , γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 ]'

0
⎡1 0
xi = ⎢
⎣0 1 Retaileri
a = 05 x1 , Σ 0 = 100 I
Then

0
Brand i

⎤
Lengthi ⎥⎦
0

f1 ~ MVN ( A, B)
−1

−1

−1

−1

B = [ X ' Σ β X + Σ 0 ] −1 , A = B[ X ' Σ β β + Σ 0 a0 ]

7. Draw f 2 = [θ 0 ,θ1 ,κ 1 ,κ 2 ,κ 3 ,κ 4 ]' similar to step 6
8. Draw f 3 = [ω 0 , ω1 , ρ11 , ρ12 , ρ13 , ρ14 , ω 2 , ρ 21 , ρ 22 , ρ 23 , ρ 24 ]' similar to step 6
9. Draw f 4 = [φ0 , φ1 , π 1 , π 2 , π 3 ]' similar to step 6
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Appendix B: Estimates (Diagonal Ω )
Table B1: Coefficient Estimates on Click-through Rate
Intercept
Retailer
Brand
Length

β0

α1

α2

α3

-2.528
(0.043)

1.505
(0.117)

-0.178
(0.058)

-0.008
(0.048)

γ1

γ2

γ3

Rank

β1
-0.079
(0.008)

-0.116
(0.048)

-0.006
(0.014)

0.023
(0.009)

Time

α4

Intercept

0.008
(0.002)

Table B2: Coefficient Estimates on Conversion Rate

Intercept

Rank

Intercept

Retailer

Brand

Length

Landing Page
Quality

θ0

δ1

δ2

δ3

δ4

-5.461
(0.098)

1.623
(0.213)

-0.917
(0.151)

-0.011
(0.106)

0.235
(0.063)

θ1
-0.114
(0.016)

κ1

κ2

κ3

κ4

0.178
(0.080)

0.059
(0.040)

0.004
(0.023)

-0.002
(0.018)

δ5
Time

0.035
(0.008)
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Table B3: Coefficient Estimates on CPC

Intercept

LagRank

Intercept

Retailer

Brand

Length

Landing
Page
Quality

ω0

λ1

λ2

λ3

λ4

-1.650
(0.024)

-0.732
(0.072)

0.165
(0.032)

-0.027
(0.025)

-0.038
(0.016)

ω1
-0.041
(0.004)

ρ11

ρ12

ρ13

ρ14

0.036
(0.010)

-0.012
(0.008)

0.019
(0.005)

-0.001
(0.004)

λ6

Time

-0.020
(0.001)

Table B4: Coefficient Estimates on Keyword Rank
Intercept
Retailer
Brand
Length

φ0

τ1

τ2

τ3

1.734
(0.031)

-0.530
(0.085)

-0.299
(0.040)

-0.236
(0.033)

π1

π2

π3

CPC

φ1
-1.881
(0.093)

0.673
(0.325)

0.322
(0.128)

0.039
(0.098)

Lag_CTR

φ2
-0.091
(0.030)

Intercept

Time

τ5
0.025
(0.001)
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